Atlantico Interview with Nicolas Marques (6 February 2026) // 10 February 2026

With Donald Trump rewriting the rules of international trade, the European economy is doomed to be nothing more than a playground for its competitors unless Europe supports a truly ambitious industrial policy. Is this initial diagnosis the right one to justify the creation of a "Buy European" policy?

When you listen to the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Stéphane Séjourné, you get the impression that, rather than being ambitious, Europe wants to guarantee its companies a minimum market share. This approach is doomed to failure if we don't tackle the root causes of the problems.

The real priority is to do what is necessary to make Europe a more dynamic area of wealth creation, which means catching up in terms of innovation. The challenge is to unleash economic creativity in Europe by removing the obstacles. If we can do that, Europeans will buy even more European products, as will the rest of the world.

Isn't the real issue Europe's current lag in innovation?

Yes, we are dramatically behind in innovation, and the "Buy European" approach does not address this issue.

It is no coincidence that we are dependent on foreign players, particularly the United States, in tech and biotech. To develop disruptive innovation, you need abundant capital that is available over the long term, because innovation processes are uncertain and lengthy.

However, the entire wealth creation chain in Europe is undersized. We have 10 times less venture capital than the United States, which penalises young companies. The EU accounted for barely 5% of venture capital raised worldwide, compared with 52% for the United States in 2023. Next, stock markets are needed to support the growth of companies. However, the capitalisation of European stock markets represents barely 65% of GDP, compared with 177% of GDP in the United States. We are missing €19.3 trillion in capital.

This is why Europe is lagging behind in innovation. At the end of 2023, the EU had barely 14 companies under 50 years old listed with a capitalisation of €10 billion or more, compared to 241 in the United States. And the capitalisation of these European companies was 68 times less than that of American companies. This is the root cause of our dependence on technology. As long as we have undercapitalised companies, innovation will happen elsewhere.

In an attempt to break out of this rut, the Commission is proposing to buy European...

Buying European will not become a reality if there are no innovative European companies. The only way out of this rut is to lay the foundations for success, not to develop stopgap measures.

If we want to get back into the innovation race, we need to rebuild a long-term capital base by developing retirement savings wherever they are insufficient in Europe. Innovation requires capital. Europe lacks this for historical reasons, because it destroyed its savings during the two world wars.

Historically, Europe's success in the early industrial revolutions was linked to the effective channelling of capital towards innovation. Savings from the countryside, and also from pension funds, were used to finance innovation in the 19th century. This made it possible to finance investments in key infrastructure, such as canals and railways, which were the equivalent of today's networks. It also enabled the development of industry and chemistry. However, our savings were ravaged by inflation linked to the two world wars and were never rebuilt. In 1945, many European countries, including France, opted for pay-as-you-go pensions. The only countries to have retained significant pension capitalisation are small ones (Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands). Thanks to this windfall, they are much more innovative than the rest of Europe.

During the second half of the 20th century, the lack of long-term savings did not mean a decline in status, as banks and insurers were very active in reconstruction and business financing. But in the 21st century, disruptive innovation, where the return on investment is uncertain, is difficult to finance through these traditional channels. Bankers can only take limited risks. Insurers have liquidity constraints, particularly when savers are likely to withdraw their capital at any time. As a result, they find it difficult to finance disruptive innovations.

Until Europe rebuilds significant retirement savings, it will not be able to get back into the innovation race. It is no coincidence that the United States is a leader in innovation; it is also a leader in retirement savings. At this stage, we are €19.7 trillion behind in retirement capitalisation in the EU. Pension savings accounted for 28% of GDP at the end of 2023 in Europe, compared with an average of 143% in the United States, representing a deficit of nearly 115% of GDP. The best industrial and social policy is to make pension funds universal.

So you don't believe at all in this Commission project, which copies the Americans by deciding to favour our products, by instilling a percentage of components that must actually be manufactured in the European Union, etc. Is this battle lost before it even begins?

What makes America rich is its ability to finance innovation through retirement savings. It is also its ecosystem, with regulations and taxation that are often less restrictive. It is not protectionist measures that make it strong, because these ultimately penalise consumers by driving up prices.

What penalises Europe is also our tendency to regulate more than elsewhere and the excessive taxation that is endemic in several countries, including France. A policy aimed at forcing consumers or administrations to buy European, without removing these barriers, will have superficial, even counterproductive, effects.

Europe was great and strong when, at its creation, all countries removed barriers, reformed to implement the single market, abolished customs borders and deregulated. But since then, Europe has forgotten this DNA. It has become over-administered, which slows down growth and penalises Europeans.

The Commission's objective is still to strengthen key sectors such as green energy, defence and digital technology...

In all these sectors, the Commission says it wants to promote areas in which its past interventions have often been problematic, which argues for more caution, less intervention and more deregulation.

Energy is a good example, with a European policy that has been counterproductive. The EU's energy balance has a deficit of €340 billion per year, which is very significant (1.9% of the EU's GDP). It would have been logical not to penalise nuclear power, which is controlled by several countries, including France. But the Commission has hampered the refinancing of this sector, with its "taxonomy" that directs savings towards other carbon-free energy sources. Although some flexibility has been introduced, it is not certain that the Commission will not hinder the financing of future French EPR2 reactors. Teresa Ribera, who is both Executive Vice-President for a "clean, fair and competitive transition" and European Commissioner for Competition, is known for her anti-nuclear stance.

Similarly, for years, European savings have been diverted away from the arms industry, which was not seen as a priority sector due to a naïve conception of social responsibility. Excessive compliance with European legislation has dried up funding for the arms industry. Europe is now organising itself to support the defence sector, but it would have been better not to penalise it in the first place.

With this "Buy European" policy, the Commission is adopting a form of protectionism similar to that in force in the United States or China. But isn't there a risk that this protectionism will increase imbalances within the European Union?

If we start restricting imports to support our production, protectionism will impoverish us, penalising consumers but also hampering our ability to export.

Let's not forget that, contrary to what is sometimes thought in France, international trade enriches Europe. In 2024, the EU accounted for 14.6% of global exports and 13.3% of imports. The EU had a trade surplus of €142 billion. Its trade surplus is significant (0.8% of GDP) and is not deteriorating over the long term.

France is certainly in a different situation. Our trade balance has been consistently in deficit since the early 2000s. But European protectionism will not reverse this trend. Our decline is as much linked to our loss of competitiveness compared to other European countries (42% of the deterioration) as it is to China. This is the result of our policies, which have led to a deliberate reduction in production through shorter working hours, or indirectly through over-regulation and excessive taxation.

And contrary to popular belief, we are not out of the woods yet. For example, despite the pro-reindustrialisation rhetoric since 2017, production taxation remains abnormally high. France accounts for 30% of production taxes levied on industry in Europe in 2024, whilst it only accounts for 11% of industrial production. If we do not remove this taxation, which encourages relocation, we will continue to increase our trade deficits.

Clearly, the challenge is to stop hindering production and innovation. This is true for Europe, and even more so for France.

This interview was first published in Atlantico.

Nicolas Marques is the Director General of the Molinari Economic Institute.